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be bound by such an order as emanating from the
authority under which it sits."
It is obvious that in the process of naval warfare in the
present day such vessels may without difficulty and with
great secrecy be used in various ways to help the enemy.
If they are, their imn1unity \Vould disappear; and it
would be open to the naval authorities under the Crown
to exclude from such immunity all similar vessels if there
was reason for believing that some of them were utilized
for aiding the enemy. And this seems to be the sense in
which the second paragraph of article 3 of The Hague
convention referred to should be regarded.
As to the Berlin, I am of opinion that she is not \Vithin
the category of coast fishing vessels entitled to freedom
from capture; on the contrary, I hold that, by reason
of her size, equipment, and voyage, she \Vas a deep-sea
fishing vessel engaged in a commercial enterprise \Vhich
formed part of the trade of the enemy country, and, as
such, could be and \Vas properly captured as prize of war.
I therefore decree the condemnation of the vessel and
cargo, and order the sale thereof.

Decision.

THE "MIRAl\11CID."
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.
PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND

AD~IIRALTY

DIVISION.

ADJ\IIRALTY.
[IN

PRIZE.]

November 23, 1914.
[1914] p. 71.

The subject matter of the claim in this case is a part case.
statement of the
cargo of 16,000 bushels of wheat carried on the steamship
Miramichi, which was seized or captured as enemy
property on September 1, 1914, in the circumstances
hereinafter mentioned.
The steamship Miramichi was a British ship. The
cargo of wheat to which the claim relates was shipped
at Galveston, Tex., and \Vas stowed, \vith other \Vheat_,
in holds 1, 4, and 6 of the vessel. It was shipped in the
month of July, 1914, before the commencement of the
war, and without any anticipation of war. It \Vas
destined for the port of Rotterdam, and was intended to
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be delivered, as to part, to George Fries & Co., of Colmar,
as purchasers of 8,000 bushels, and, as to the other part,
to Gebrueder Zimmern & Co., of Mannheim, as purchasers of 8,000 bushels. Both these firms were German
firms, and at the time of seizure or capture of the cargo
were enemy subjects.
The two transactions were separate; but there is no
distinction in substance, or from the legal aspect, between the two. It will therefore be sufficient to deal in
this judgment with one of the cases; and I will take the
first, namely, the case of the sale by Messrs. Muir & Co.
to Fries & Co.
The cargo of wheat destined for Fries & Co. was, as
I have said, laden on board the British steamship
Miramichi. On her voyage toward Rotterdam, her
owners by telegraph directed the vessel to proceed to
Queenstown for orders by reason of the outbreak of war.
At Queenstown the owners communicated with the
British Admiralty and asked their instructions as to
whether the steamship could proceed to Rotterdam, as
the cargo was destined for German merchants. Permission to proceed to Rotterdam was refused, and
accordingly the vessel proceeded to the port of Eastham,
in the Manchester Ship Canal, as the best port for the
disposal of the cargo.
A question might have arisen as to whether the cargo
was captured at sea or seized in port. But that makes
no material difference in this case, and it is agreed that
the cargo was seized in the port of Eastham.
The seizure was on September 1, 1914. The Crown
claims the cargo as prize or as droi ts of admiralty. The
claimants, on the other hand, contend that the cargo
was not subject to seizure as it did not belong to enemy
subjects, but to themselves as neutrals, being citizens of
the United States of America.
November 23. SIR SA]tfUEL EvANS, president. [Mter
stating the facts already set out the learned president
continued:] The contest between the Crown and the
claimants may be shortly stated as follows:
The contention of the attorney general for the Cro'vn
was that the cargo at the time of seizure was at the risk
of subjects of the German Empire, then at 'var, as purchasers, and therefore was subject to seizure on behalf of
the Cro,vn. The contention of the claimants, on the con-
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trary, \Vas that the cargo was their property, and therefore could not be lawfully seized.
The facts as to the contract for sale and purchase of the and
Contract
for sale
purchase.
cargo must now be stated in substance, but briefly.
I will premise that the contract, and all material transactions in relation to it up to the time of seizure of the
cargo, were entered into before the war and in entire innocence of any anticipation of war. In short, all the transactions so far as concerned the claimants \Vere carried out
in times and conditions of peace. The claimants \Vere
the sellers of the goods, and their bankers who discounted
the bill of exchange. They have made common cause,
and no distinction need be made between them in this
judgment. I 'viii describe the claimants, Messrs. Muir &
Co., as "the sellers," and Fries & Co., the German merchants, as ''the buyers."
The sellers contracted to sell the cargo to the buyers on
June 25 for shipment during the month of July, 1914,
from a port of the United States of America direct or indirect to Rotterdam at a price to include cost, freight, and
insurance; in other words, the contract was \Vhat is so
well known as a c. i. f. contract. Payment (or in the
American terminology "reimbursement") was to be "by
check against documents." The sellers \Vere to furnish
policies of insurance, or certificates of insurance (free of
war risk). A clause for settlement of disputes in London
was included, which shows . (apart from anything else)
that any disputes \Vere to be determined according to
English law.
The sellers had bought the wheat to enable them to
fulfill their contract 'vith the buyers from C. B. Fox, a
grain merchant in Galveston.
The wheat \Vas shipped by Fox at Galveston on July
23, 1914. The bill of lading "\Vas given in favor of Fox,
the shipper, and \Vas made out unto the order of one
Davis, or to his or their assigns. , It \Vas indorsed generally, and in due course the sellers paid Fox for the 'vheat
and obtained the bill of lading. They did not indorse it
in favor of the buyers, and it remained a bill of lading only
indorsed generally.
The necessary insurances \Vere effected and the certificates of insurance were obtained by the sellers on July 23.
On July 28 the sellers dre\V a bill of exchange upon the
buyers and, according to the statement of the attorney
59650-24--2
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general, discounted it with the bankers (the Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York, 'vho have joined them as claimants). On the same date they deposited 'vith the bankers the bill of lading and certificates of insurance to be
delivered upon payment by the buyers through a Berlin
bank of the amount due on the bill of exchange for the
cost and insurance, less the freight, 'vhich was credited,
as it was to be paid for by the buyers on delivery.
On the same date also the original documents were forwarded to the Berlin bank for credit of the N e'v York
bank by the steamship Sa'voie, which sailed from N e'v
York on July 29 and arrived at Le Havre on August 5;
and duplicate docu1nents were forwarded by the steamship Garmania, which sailed from N e'v York on July 29
and arrived at Liverpool on August 7. The buyers were
duly notified of these matters, and an invoice was forwarded to them by the sellers on the same day (July 28)
with all the necessary particulars of the shipment, bill
of exchange, and documents.
So far as the buyers are concerned, no further information was given to the court except that the documents
were tendered to them, and that on the tender they refused to accept the documents, or to pay the sum due
under the bill of exchange and indorsed on the bill of
lading as follows: "Refused on account of late production,
nearly one month after normal due date. Colmar, September 3, 1914. Geo. Frie~."
That reason was a mere excuse; the real reason, no
doubt, was that 'var had broken out. The sellers,
therefore, or their bankers, still hold the bill of lading,
and the bill of exchange remains unpaid.
These, I think, are all the rna terial facts.
The question of law, as I have stated, is, Was the cargo
on September 1 subject to seizure or capture by or on
behalf of the Crown as droits of adn1iralty or prize~
Before this question is dealt with, I desire to point out,
and to emphasize, that ' nothing which I shall say in this
case is applicable to capture or seizure at sea or in port
of any property dealt with during the 'var, or in anticipation of the war. Questions relating to such property
arc on an entirely different footing from those relating
to transactions initiated during the happier ti1nes of
peace. 'fhe former are determined largely or mainly
upon considerations of the rights of belligerents and of
attempts to defeat such rights. I 'viii refrain from dis-
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cussing these matters, and 'vill only refer to such authorities as the Sally, 9 hearcL on appeal by the Lords Commissioners of Appeals in prize in 1795, the Packet de Bilbao/ 0
and the ...4riel, 11 for the principles applicable in the prize
court during a state of war.
In the case· now before the court, there is no place for
any idea of an attempt to defeat the rights of this country
as a belligerent; and the case has to be determined in
accordance with the principles by which rights of property are ascertained by our la'v in time of peace.
The main contest was as to the right test to apply
in these circumstances for determining whether a particular property was subject to seizure or capture.
Another point was taken and argued, chiefly by junior
counsel for the claimants, that in any event enen1y
property in a British ship could not.be seized in port or
captured n,t sea.
I will state the contention and propositions submitted
by the learned attorney general in his own \Vords.
He said, "My first proposition is that the test of the
right to capture and sale is the answer to the question
on whom is the risk at the moment of cnpture? That
is to say, Who suffers if the goods are captured~ Applying
that test, the A1nerican claimants here \vould have had
a 'jus disponendi' because they are holding the bill of
lading, which has not been indorsed, and therefore they
would have to that extent of course a special propPrty,
a property interest in the cargo, but th<:'y \Vould not
have a general property in the cargo; still·less \Vould they
have the risk; and there is a third proposition, \Vhich is
really a development of the other proposition, nan1el.\~ ,
the American sellers had a vested right of pay1nrnt ~
\vhatever happened to the goods on the tend<:'r of the
documents; and I \viii add as a point for 1ny third proposition that for the purpose of determining \vhcther tho
cargo is good prize (which is quite a separate question
from ~he other), the material question is not the abstract
question of property, but \Vhether it is an enemy or a
neutral \vho ·will suffer if the cargo is condemned- on
whom is the risk~" And· summing it up the learned
attorney general later submitted, "If my main proposition is right, in a prize court one is not concerned \vith
9

(1795) 3 C. Rob. 300, note.

to (1799) 2 C. Rob. 133.

n (1857) 11 ~roo . P. C. 119.

Risk.

Jus disponendi.
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these niceties about the abstract law of property; but
the point really is, at the moment of capture, the goods
being on the high seas, is it or not open to the consignor
to compel payment by the consignee~ That is the real
test. Then plainly I am entitled here to the condemnation of the goods."
As I have intimated, it was subsequently assumed, and
for this purpose agreed by the attorney general, that the
goods were seized when afloat in port; but that makes no
material difference.
Beneficial
The contrary contention of Mr. Leslie Scott for the
.ownership.
claimants was that "the true criterion to apply where
goods are shipped before war is, Whose goods are they 1
In whom is the property-in the sense of a beneficial
ownership of the- goods-vested~"
Very difficult quastions often arise at law as to 'vhen
the property in goods carried by sea is transferred, or
vests; and at whose risk goods are at a particular time,
or· who suffers by their loss.
These are the kind of questions which are often brushed
aside in the prize court when the transactions in 'vhich
they are involved take place during war or 'vere embarked in when war 'vas imminent or anticipated.
But where, as in the present case, all the material
parts of the business transaction took place bona fide
during peace, and it becomes necessary to decide questions of property, I hold that the law to be applied is the
ordinary municipal lavv governing contracts for the sale
and purchase of goods.
Tran s t e r in
Where !!Oods
are contracted to be sold and are shipped
peace.
._.
during peace without any anticipation of imminent war,
and are seized or captured afloat after war has supervened, the cardinal principle is, in my opinion, that they
are not subject to seizure or capture unless under the
contract the property in the goods has by that time
passed to the enemy.
It may be that the element of risk may legitimately
enter into the consideration of the question 'vhether the
property has passed or has become transferred. But the
incidence of risk or loss is no't by any means the determining factor of property or o'vnership. (Cf. s. 20 of the
sale of goods act, 1893.) The main determining factor is
whether according to the intention of seller and buyer
the property had passed.
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The question which governs this case, therefore, is,
\vhose property \vere the goods at the time of seizure~
This principle is consonant \vith good sense, and with
the notion of \vhat is right in comn1ercial dealings. It is
also in accordance with the doctrines adopted by the
eminent jurists V{ho have become authorities on the law
of nations, and applied in the decisions of our prize
courts (sec e. g., The Oousine Marianne, 12 The Ida, 13 The
Abo, 14 The Vrow Margaretha/ 5 and The Ar·iel. 16
The learned attorney general by the tenor of his argument rendered it almost unnecessary for me to go through
the many authorities dealing \Vith the vesting or transfer
of property under such a contract, or to discuss the question whether the property in this case had, on September 1, passed from the sellers and become vested in the
buyers.
He did not, as I understood, argue that the property
had passed to the enemy buyers. Fie admitted that the
neutral sellers had a jus disponendi, because they held
the bill of lading, which \Vas not indorsed; although possibly he may have intended to qualify this adn1ission by
saying that ''Therefore the sellers \Vould have, to that
extent, a special property'' in the goods.
But at any rate, as he did not contend that by law the
property had passed to the buyers, I think it sufficient to
deal very briefly with the matter, and to state my conclusions \vithout elaborating the grounds.
In my opinion the result of the many decisions from
Wait v. Baker17 up to Ogg v. Shutcr, 18 ~1irabita v. Ottoman Bank/9 and thence up to the sale of goods act, 1893,
and of the provisions of the sale of goods act, 1893, itself,
following closely on these matters the judgment of Cotton L. J., in Mirabita v. Ottoman Bank19 (3); and of the
decisions subsequent to the act, c. g., Dupont v. British
South Africa Co., 20 Ryan v. Ridley,2 1 and Biddcll v. E.
Clemens Horst22 , is that, in the circumstances of the present case, the goods had not at the time of seizure passed
to the buyers; but that the sellers had reserved a right
(1810) Edw. 346.
(I854) Spinks, 26.
H (I854) Spinks, 42.
1s (I799) I C. Rob. 336.
16 11 ~loo. P. C. 119.
17 08·i8) 2 Ex. I.
18 (I875) I C. P. D. 47.
19 (I878) 3 Ex. D. I64.
2o (I90I) 18 Times L. R. 24.
21 (I902) 8 Com. Cas. 105.
! 2 [I911] I K. B. 214, 934; [I912J A . C. 18.
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of disposal or a jus disponendi over them, and that the
goods still remained their property, and would so remain
until the shipping documents had been tendered to and
taken over by the buyers, and the bill of exchange for the
price had been paid.
Decision .
It follows that the goods seized 'vere the property of the
American claimants, and 'vere not subject to seizure;
the court decrees according! y, and orders the goods to be
released to the claimants.
The other point referred to remains; and as it was
argued and has been foreshadowed in other cases, I ,viii
deal \vith it, although, in view of the decision just given,
it becomes immaterial.
is~~~~~. in Brit- It is that as the cargo 'vas in a British ship, it could
not be seized or captured even if it was enemy property.
In my opinion this proposition is wholly lacking in
foundation. No authority was cited for it. Such a
contention has never been put forward, because, as I
think, no one has thought that it could prevail.
Enemy property at sea or in port can be captured or
seized except where an express immunity has been
created.
Wheaton's
Abundance of authority exists for this in the acknowlopinion.
edged books of international jurists. I will only cite
one, namely, Wheaton; I will cite from what is regarded
as the best edition, that of Mr. Dana, published in 1866.
After an exhaustive and most interesting account of
the right of capt·ure according to the usage of 'var on
land and on sea, Wheaton wrote as follows: ''Section
355. The progress of civilization has slo,vly, but constantly, tended to soften the extreme severity of the
operations of war by land; but it still remains unrelaxed
in respect to maritime warfare, in which the private
property of the enemy taken at sea or afloat in port is
indiscriminately liable to capture and confiscation.
This inequality in the operation of the la,vs of 'var, by
land and by sea, has been justified by alleging the usage
of considering private property, 'vhen captured in cities
taken by storm, as booty; and the 'vell-kno"\vn fact that
contributions are levied upon territories occupied by a
hostile army, in lieu of a general confiscation of the
property belonging to the inhabitants; and that the
object of 'vars by land being conquest or the acquisition
of territory to be exchanged as an equivalent for other
territory lost, the regard of the victor for those who are
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to be or have been his subjects naturally restrains him
from the exercise of his extreme rights in this particular;
'vherea.s, the object of maritime 'vars is the destruction of the enemy's commerce and navigation-the sources
and sine,vs of his naval po,ver-vlhich object can only
be attained by the capture and confiscation of private
property.''
I 'vill also cite Mr. Dana's note upon this section as it
'vas written years after the declaration of Paris.
''Note 171. Distinction bet,vcen enen1y's property at m~tna' s comsea and on land. The text docs not present the principal
argument for the distinction observed in practice bet,veen private property on land and at sea; nor, indeed,
has this subject been adequately treated upon principle,
if that has even been atten1pted, by most text 'vriters.
War is the exercise of force by bodies politic for the
purpose of coercion. Niodern civilization has recognized
certain modes of coercion as justifiable. 'fheir exercise
upon material in~erests is preferable to acts of force
upon the person. Where private property is taken, it
is because it is of such a character or so situated as to
n1ake its capture a justifiable means of coercing the po,ver
'vith which 've are at 'var. If the hostile po,ver has an
interest in the property which is available to hiin for
the purposes of 'var, that fact Inakes it prima facie a
subject of capture. The enemy has such an interest in
all convertible and mercantile property 'vithin his control,
or belonging to persons who are living under his control,
whether it he on land or at sea; for it is a subject of taxation, contribution, or confiscation. 'fhe humanity and
policy of modern times have abstained fron1 the taking
of private property, not liable to direct use in ,v·ar, 'vhcn
on land. Son1e of the reasons for this are the infinite
varieties of the character of such property-fron1 things
almost sacred. to those purely merchantable; the difficulty
of discriminating among these varieties: the need of
much of it to support the life of noncombatant persons
and of animals; the unlimited range of places and objects
that 'vould be opened to the military; anfl the n1oral
dangers attending searches an<l captures in households
and among noncotnhatants. J)ut on the high SPH~ thPsP
reasons do not apply. Strictl.v pPrsona] efl'ects are not
taken. Cargoes arc usually purely 1nerch undise. ~[ t•rchandise sent to sen i3 sent voluntarily; ern hnrkecl hy
n1erchants on an enterprise of profit, taking the risks of
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war; its value is usually capable of compensation in
money, and may be protected by insurance; it is in the
custody of men trained and paid for the purpose; and
the sea, upon which it is sent, is res omnium, the common
field of war as well as of commerce. The purpose of
maritime commerce is the enriching of the o\vner by the
transit over this common field; and it is the usual object
of revenue to the po,ver under whose government the
owner resides.
summary.
"The matter may, then, be summed up thus: Merchandise, \Vhether embarked upon the sea or found on land,
in which the hostile power has some interest for purposes
of \var, is prima facie a subject of capture. Vessels and
their cargoes ate usually of that character. Of the infinite
varieties of property on shore some are of this character
and some not. There are very serious objections of a
moral and economical nature to subjecting all property
on land to military seizure. These objections have been
thought sufficient to reverse the prima facie right of capture. '1'o 1nerchandise at sea these objections apply with
so little force that the prima facie right of capture
remains.''
There is no distinction no\V tq be made bet\veen capture
at sea and seizure in port; and apart from the practice
introduced by the declaration of Paris in favor of neutral
vessels it does not matter in what ships the cargoes seized
cil~~i~~ iu c ouu- or captured may happen to be. According to the order
made in council, in 1665, as to the rights of the Lord High
Admiral in former times, which are no\V the rights of the
l(ing in his office of admiralty, ''all ships and goods
coming into ports, creeks, or roads of England or Ireland,
unless they come in voluntarily on revolt or are driven
in by the King's cruisers," belonged to the lord high
admiral, and now belong to the Cro\vn, and according to
Lord Stowell, "Usage has construed this to include ships
and goods already come into ports, creeks, or roads, and
these not only of England and Ireland, but of all the
dominions thereunto belonging"; see the Rebeckah. 23
Eu(lmy goods
It has never been urged that enemy goods are free from
i n Uritish ~ hips.
capture or seizure if they happen to be in British ships.
'fhis is, no doubt, the reason \vhy there are no reported
judgments upon the point, but if decisions of prize courts
are desired to shov.r that enemy cargoes in British ships
h ave been captured, reference can be made to the Con23

(1799) I. C. R ob. 227.
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queror 24 and the Mashona, 25 and the Journal of Comparative Legislation, 1900, page 326. See also The Cargo ex
Emulous,2 6 sub nomine Bro,vn v. The United States, 27 for
the opinion of Story J. in similar cases.
As to the suggestion that the right of seizure or capture
of enemy property carried as cargoes in British ships no
longer exists after the declaration of Paris, it is obvious
that the declaration only modified or limited the right in
favor of neutrals for the benefit and protection of the
commerce of neutrals and in the interest of international
comities, and did not in any other respect weaken or
destroy the general right.
It is well kno,vn that the United States of Americatr. i~~erican
refrained from acceding to the declaration of Paris
because they desired that all property of private persons
should be exempted from capture at sea-to which most
other States have always refused to agree.
And in practice what would become of such cargo es~
A British ship could not, in times of 'var, carry it or hand
it over to the enemy either directly or through any intermediary, as it is not permitted to her to have any intercourse with the enemy.
In my view it is abundantly clear that enemy goods
carried in British vessels are subject to seizure in port and
capture at sea in times of war.
As the cargo has been sold, the order of the court will
be for the payment out of the proceeds to the claimants.
The ATTORNEY GENERAL. I ask for a reasonable time
for appealing.
The PRESIDENT. Certainly. Stay of proceedings for
three weeks, and, if notice is given for appeal, stay of
proceedings will be till the hearing of the appeal.
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THE "MARIA."
IN H. B. 1f. PRIZE COURT FOR EGYPT.
:March 17, 19] 5.
1 Trehern, British and Colonial Prize Cases, 259.

Claim for condemnation of the Turkish sailing ship c~t~.tcnwut or tho
Maria, a vessel of 27 tons engaged in general coasting
u (1800) 2 C. Rob. 303.
2s
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